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This article presents a formal theory of aggregation, called landscape theory, and provides two tests of the theory. 'Aggregation' means the organization of elements of a system in patterns that tend to put highly compatible elements together and less compatible elements apart. Landscape theory uses abstract concepts from the physical sciences and biology that have proved useful in studying the dynamics of complex systems. These concepts provide a way of thinking about the many possible ways in which elements of a system can fit together, predicting which configurations are most likely to occur, how much dissatisfaction with the outcome is inevitable and how the system will respond to changes in the relationship between the elements. As applied to political, economic and social problems, landscape theory can be used to analyse a wide variety of aggregation problems that have previously been considered in isolation:
(1) international alignments, (2) alliances of business firms to set standards, (3) coalitions of political parties in parliaments, (4) social networks, (5) social cleavages in democracies, and (6) organizational structures.
In order to be useful, a theory of aggregation should have the following properties.
(a) The theory should provide a coherent explanation of why some particular aggregations (alliances, coalitions, organizational structures, etc.) form in a given system, and not others. (b) The theory should illuminate the dynamics of aggregation to provide a deeper understanding of the actual process involved as well as the end result. (c) The theory should be general enough to apply to many domains of politics and society. (d) The theory should be simple enough to illuminate some fundamental aspects of aggregation. (e) The theory should be capable of being operationalized so that its predictions can be tested.
This article seeks to demonstrate that the landscape theory of aggregation offers excellent promise of fulfilling all five of these conditions. In particular, this article provides the first empirical test of a theory of alignment in international politics. It does so by providing a new theoretical approach to aggregation dynamics and by being practical about measurement. The significance of landscape theory is that it can provide a deeper understanding of a wide variety of important aggregation processes in politics, economics and society. How the elements of a system fit together has important implications for such vital issues as the balance of power in international politics, the way in which competing businesses can agree to set standards for their products, the construction of ruling coalitions among parties in parliamentary democracies and the ways political parties appeal to voters in a society with overlapping and crosscutting cleavages.
By using a common set of concepts to explain a variety of distinct subjects, the current understanding of each subject can be used to help illuminate the others. Moreover, by using a common theory, such as landscape theory, one might reach a deeper understanding of how the aggregation process in each of these domains is similar to the others and how each is different from the others. In addition to purely scientific significance, landscape theory can be used as a guide to policy. For example, by providing a coherent explanation of which international alignments are likely to form, it can suggest where leverage can most efficiently be applied to move from one configuration to another. As another example, the theory could suggest which domestic political coalitions are inherently unstable and which would become stable if critical subgroups could be induced to make minor changes.
The next section formally presents landscape theory, followed by a section on how the concept of an abstract landscape has been used in the physical and natural sciences. Then two operationalizations and tests of the theory are provided, one from international politics and the other from economics. The penultimate section shows how the theory could be applied to four other domains as well. The final section considers how the foundations of landscape theory can be made more rigorous.
LANDSCAPE THEORY
This section explains the formal aspects of the theory, shows how the concepts of the approach may help to illuminate an aggregation process and enumerates the predictions that can be derived from the theory. Landscape theory predicts how actors will form alignments. To help keep the terminology as simple as possible, the language of international alignments will be used. The theory makes two basic assumptions, both drawn from the recognition that it is difficult for a national leadership to assess the value of each potential alignment. The first assumption is that a nation is myopic in its assessments. In other words, a national leadership evaluates how well it gets along with any other nation independent of all the other members in the system. By making only pairwise evaluations, the national leadership avoids the difficult problem of assessing all combinations of nations at once.
The second basic assumption of landscape theory is that adjustments to alignments take place by incremental movement of individual nations. This rules out the possibility that a coalition will form within an alignment and then switch allegiance as a block. This strong assumption is appropriate when information regarding payoffs is uncertain, resulting in causal ambiguity between alignment actions and payoffs, and a consequent increase in negotiation costs and a reduction in the ability of nations to use side payments to arrive at an optimal solution.
Landscape theory begins with a set of n actors (for example, nations). The size of a nation, si > 0, is a reflection of the importance of that country to others. Size might be measured by demographic, industrial or military factors, or a combination of these, depending on what is taken to be important in a particular application.
The key premise of landscape theory is that each pair of nations, i and j, has a propensity, pj, to work together. The propensity number is positive and large if the two nations get along well together and negative if they have many sources of potential conflict. Put another way, propensity is a measure of how willing the two nations are to be in the same coalition together. If one country has a source of conflict with another (such as a border dispute), then the second country typically has the same source of conflict with the first. Thus the theory assumes that propensity is symmetric, so that pij = pi.
A configuration is a partition of the nations, that is a placement of each nation into one and only one grouping. An example is the post-war situation in which the non-neutral nations of Europe were divided between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A specific configuration, X, determines the distance, dij, between any two countries, i and j. In the simplest version of the theory all countries are assumed to be in one of two possible groupings, so we can let distance be 0 if the two countries are in the same grouping, and 1 if the two 214 AXELROD AND BENNETT countries are in different groupings. In other situations, other measures of distance in a configuration will be appropriate.' Using distance and propensity it is now possible to define a measure of frustration: how poorly or well a given configuration satisfies the propensities of a given country to be near or far from each other country. A nation, i, wants to switch sides if the frustration is less on the other side. The frustration of a country, i, in a configuration, X, is just Fi(X) = ZsjPijd, (X) (1)
where sj is the size of j, Pij is the propensity of i to be close to j, and dij(X) is the distance from i to j in configuration X. The summation is taken over all countries except j = i. Note that the definition of frustration weights propensities to work with or against another country by the size of the other country. This takes account of the fact that a source of conflict with a small country is not as important for determining alignments as an equivalent source of conflict with a large country. Notice that a country's frustration will be minimized if it is:
(a) in the same alliance as those countries with which it has a positive propensity to align, since otherwise pj> O and di(X) > 0, and (b) in a different alliance from those countries with which it has a negative propensity to align, since this would make dij(X) > 0 when pi < 0.
Note also that the myopic assumption is built into the definition of frustration since a given country's evaluation of a configuration depends on its pairwise propensities with each of the other nations and does not take into account any higher order interactions among groups of countries. The next step is to define the energy of an entire configuration, X, as the weighted sum of the frustrations of each nation in that configuration, where the weights are just the sizes of the nations. This gives the energy of a configuration as:
Substituting the definition of frustration into this equation allows the calculation of the energy of a configuration in terms of size of the countries, their propensities to work together, and their distances in a particular configuration:
i,j
The summation is over all ordered pairs of distinct countries. The formula for the energy of a configuration captures the idea that energy is lower (and the configuration is better) when nations that want to work 'For example, the distance between two jobs in a hierarchical organizational structure can be regarded as the number of layers of the organization that have to be ascended to reach a common boss. See p. 232 below. together are in the same grouping, and those that want to work against each other are in different groupings. Size plays a role because having a proper relationship with a large country is more important than having a proper relationship with a small country.
Energy
Once energy is defined, the abstraction begins to pay off. Given the energy of each configuration it is possible to construct an energy landscape. The landscape is simply a graph which has a point for each possible configuration, and a height above this point for the energy of that configuration. Figure 1 shows an example of a landscape where each point in the plane at the bottom of the figure indicates a specific configuration and the surface above the plane represents the energy of that configuration. Adjacent points on the landscape are those that differ in the alignment of a single nation. The landscape has a dimension for each country indicating which alignment it is in. Since it is not possible to draw a large-dimensional hypercube, in Figure 1 we have provided a conceptual (two dimensional) surface instead.
The incremental assumption allows predictions to be made about the dynamics of the system. The incremental assumption provides that only one nation at a time will change sides and will do so in a manner to lower its own frustration. Given that the energy of a configuration is the weighted sum of the frustrations of individual nations, when one nation lowers its frustration, the energy of the entire system is lowered.2 The resulting reduction in energy means that wherever the system starts on the energy landscape, it will run 'downhill' to an adjacent configuration that has lower energy. Thus the changes in alignment patterns will stop only when a configuration is reached that is a local minimum. For example, in Figure 1 there are two local minima and thus two potentially stable configurations. Stability here means that the configuration (that is, alignment pattern) does not change any further under existing conditions. Which stable configuration will occur depends on where the system starts. For example, in Figure 1 any configuration on the left-hand side of the figure tends to move to the low point on the left-hand side, which happens to be the global minimum. All the configurations that would lead to this minimum can be thought of as the basin of attraction of that minimum.
Specifically, the predictions of landscape theory are:
(1) From a given starting configuration, the configuration will change according to the principle of downward movement to an adjacent configuration. (2) Consequently, the only stable configurations are those that are at a local minimum in the landscape. (3) With symmetric propensities there can be no cycles of configurations (such as moving from X to Yto Z and then back to X).3
An interesting implication of this approach is that the equilibrium reached need not be a global optimum. For example, in Figure 1 there are two local minima into which the system can settle. The local minimum on the right is not as good at satisfying the propensities of the countries as is the one on the left. Therefore, if the system happened to start on the far right, it would settle down to a local minimum that was not a global minimum. Another implication is that there may not be any configuration that completely satisfies everyone. Even for a configuration that is the global optimum, most or even all nations may be somewhat frustrated in the sense that some 'friends' will be in the opposite grouping and/or some 'enemies' will be in the same grouping. For example, if there are three nations that mutually dislike each other (such as Israel, Syria and Iraq), then any possible bipolar configuration will leave someone frustrated.
A further implication is that the local optimum into which the system settles can depend on the history of the system. Early history, which might be in part the consequence of small events or even chance circumstances, can determine which outcome prevails. Thus the outcome may be in part the consequence of a 'frozen accident' just as the QWERTY keyboard is.4 Once the system settles into a basin, it may be difficult to leave it. Moreover, if there is more than one local optimum, the one that the system settles into may not be the one with the lowest energy or the least total frustration.5
The theory is relevant to policy in that it illuminates where minor changes in the initial configuration can lead to major changes in the final configuration. If one begins near the boundary of two basins of attraction, then a small movement at the start can lead to large changes in the final outcome. In addition, the height of the 'pass' between valleys gives the magnitude of the 'energy barrier' separating one basin of attraction from another and therefore measures how difficult it would be to move the system from one local optimum to another.
To summarize: landscape theory begins with sizes and pairwise propensities that are used to calculate the energy of each possible configuration and then uses the resulting landscape to make predictions about the dynamics of the system.
ABSTRACT LANDSCAPES IN THE PHYSICAL AND NATURAL SCIENCES
The idea of an abstract landscape has been widely used in the physical and natural sciences to characterize the dynamics of systems. It was originally developed to study potential energy in physical systems and had its first rigorous development in the context of Hamiltonian systems.6 Biologists have independently developed landscapes to characterize evolutionary movement in an The landscape theory of aggregation uses concepts that have been developed most thoroughly by physicists and chemists under the label of 'frustrated systems' or 'spin glasses'.9 A simple example is the Ising model that studies how magnets on a plane can attain various alignments based upon their mutual attraction or repulsion.'0 Another common application is the stability of alignment of chemical bonds." Landscape theory borrows four key ideas from these settings: a set of elements have pairwise propensities to align with each other in specific ways, each possible configuration has an 'energy', the resulting landscape shows all possible configurations, and the dynamics of the system can be predicted from the initial conditions and the shape of the landscape. Landscape theory adds the possibility of unequal sizes of units and allows operationalizations of propensities and distances that are appropriate to specific social science applications. Unlike spin glass theory, landscape theory does not assume that the propensities are randomly determined. Recently, landscapes have been used to explore fundamental properties of dynamic systems. In particular, catastrophe theory studies how basins of attraction can be formed or disappear due to changes in the shape of the landscape. 12 Landscapes have not been widely used in game theory, but some of the predictions of landscape theory can be stated in game theoretic terms. Landscape theory says that the stable configurations are exactly those that are in Nash equilibrium. What landscape theory adds to game theory is a way of characterizing all possible configurations and the dynamics among them. In particular, the idea of descent from less satisfactory patterns to more satisfactory patterns helps one characterize the entire range of possibilities in a manner that is sometimes obscure in game theoretic treatments of n-person settings. Moreover, the idea of descent need not be justified by an appeal to far-sighted rational decision making, but can easily be the result of a process in which each actor responds to the current situation in a short-sighted attempt to achieve local improvement. Before turning to some applications of the landscape theory of aggregation, it should be pointed out that aggregation has been studied without landscapes as a descriptive problem in statistics. In the social sciences, the most commonly used descriptive technique is cluster analysis.'3 Cluster analysis has been described as 'the art of finding groups in data','4 and is used 'as a descriptive or exploratory tool, in contrast with statistical tests which are carried out for inferential or confirmatory purposes'. as stable any alignment where the two alliances are balanced in terms of size, as these configurations are at a local minimum of energy. If size is interpreted as power, the predictions of landscape theory under realist assumptions are precisely balance of power alliances. Actually, when states make alignment choices they take into account more than just power. Walt develops neo-realism by showing that states balance against particular threats.18 Snyder notes that states have some interests which affect their behaviour towards all other countries, such as the desire to be militarily secure, but also have specific conflicts and affinities with particular other states based upon ideological, ethnic, economic or prestige values.l9 These 'general interests' and 'particular interests' establish a 'tacit pattern of alignment' among states.20 Combining these interests with the neo-realist paradigm, it can be argued that Snyder's 'conflicts and commonalities' contribute to the threat that states perceive from others. Liska goes so far as to suggest that ideology and historic biases may preclude 'rational' alignment choices.2' In fact, it is not unusual for scholars to note that alliance choices depend upon both power and interest.22
Unfortunately, particular interests and affinities have not yet been integrated into a coherent model of alignments. Landscape theory offers a way to provide this integration by representing divergent interests in the single concept of propensity, which combines with the size (power) of states to determine outcomes.
Landscape theory also provides a way of overcoming a second limitation of some leading alliance studies.23 These studies of alliance formation focus on the decisions of individual states and hence do not predict the overall pattern of alliance aggregation. Landscape theory predicts the overall configuration by explicitly taking into account sequences of state action in reducing frustration until a local minimum is reached.
Let us now turn to the operationalization and testing of landscape theory as it applies to international alignments. In any application, the operationalization and testing of landscape theory requires answers to four questions. Table 1 ). In both configurations, Greece and Yugoslavia join the Soviet Union largely to avoid aligning with Germany, with which both have a history of war. Likewise, in both configurations, Germany and the Soviet Union were on opposite sides. Almost everyone had reasons to avoid aligning with either Germany or the Soviet Union. The key difference is that the democracies and their friends aligned against one of these large antagonists in the first configuration and aligned against the other one in the second configuration.
The actual alignment of the Second World War has thus been predicted quite well as early as 1936 by landscape theory using a standard power measure and the propensity measure developed above. However, it is possible that the simpler 'realist' approach would do just as well. The realist approach assumes that all countries, or at least all major countries, fear each other. This can be operationalized in terms of the landscape theory by setting the pairwise propensities to be equal and negative, say -1. We tested the realist model and found that it did poorly. An analysis of the seventeen countries with all -1 propensities and the size measure from above found not two but 209 different stable configurations, none of which was as accurate as the landscape theory prediction. An analysis of the five Great Powers with -1 propensities found four possible stable configurations, of which none was the actual outcome of Britain, France and the Soviet Union aligned against Germany and Italy. It seems that without the additional information provided by knowing what specific ethnic, religious, territorial, ideological and historic issues existed between countries in 1936, a realist model does not have adequate information 34 For example, as late as 1939 when the Soviet Union invaded Finland, there were some active voices in Britain and France calling for intervention against the Soviet Union, despite the growing consensus that Germany was the major threat. Had Germany not blocked access by invading Norway, such action against the Soviets would not have been out of the question. Incidentally, the main reason that Yugoslavia and Greece side with the Soviet Union in Configuration 2 is that they both have a war history with Germany, but no serious problems with the Soviet Union. 35 The error of placing Poland on the anti-German side occurred because Poland disliked the Soviet Union even more than it disliked Germany. This in turn was largely due to the Soviet Union's greater size (national capabilities) in 1936. As discussed below, this error was eliminated by 1939 as Germany mobilized its strength faster than the Soviet Union did. Portugal, which was actually neutral, was incorrectly placed on the German side because that side was more favourable for Portugal's Catholic religious propensity.
to make useful predictions. The basic problem with the realist approach is that without enough information to distinguish various types of pairwise propensities to align, large numbers of different alignments are equally plausible.
It is also possible that a cluster analysis of the propensity matrix might have revealed the Second World War alignment. Although cluster analysis normally assumes that the objects being clustered have equal weight, to approximate the landscape analysis more closely, we created a dissimilarity matrix of propensities weighted by sizes. We clustered this matrix with a standard hierarchical agglomerative technique, using the unweighted pair-group average (UPGMA) method of computing cluster dissimilarities, which we believe to be most appropriate for our purposes.36 The two-cluster solution found Greece and the Soviet Union against everyone else, similar to the second optimum found by landscape theory, but not close to what happened historically. When we clustered Great Powers only, the analysis similarly placed the Soviet Union on the opposite side to Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
Thus it seems that in a static analysis, landscape theory is superior to alternative methods of computing likely alignments. A further test can be provided by the observation that, as the Second World War approached, the relative sizes (that is, national capabilities) of the countries changed, due largely to the rapid growth of military expenditures, especially in Germany. An interesting exercise is to see how the landscape and the predictions change as these changes in national capabilities are entered into the calculations, bringing us closer to the time when war actually broke out.37
For 1937, the same two configurations appear as we saw for 1936, namely Configuration 1 which is the alignment of the Second World War (except for Poland and Portugal), and Configuration 2 which is the pro-and-anti Soviet alignment. In 1938, however, there is only one local minimum and it is Configuration 1 again. Configuration 2 is no longer a local minimum. This coincides with the growing consensus in Britain that co-ordination with the Soviet Union might become necessary despite the repugnance of communism. In 1939, there is again only one local minimum, and it is similar to Configuration 1, only now Poland has moved from the anti-Soviet side to the anti-German side. This coincides with the growing strength of Germany which made it much stronger than the Soviet Union by 1939.
In summary, the theory does very well in predicting the European alignment of the Second World War with data up to 1936, but does even better as later data are used. By 1938, the predictions are narrowed from two to one, and by 1939 the single prediction becomes accurate for all but one of the seventeen 36 Kaufman and Rousseeuw, Finding Groups in Data, pp. 47-8. 37 The only change in the factors that went into the propensities from 1936 to 1939 was that Romania switched from a democratic government to an authoritarian government in 1938. Thus the changes in the landscape from 1936 to 1939 were almost entirely due to changes in the national capabilities of the various countries as they mobilized for war.
countries.38 The chance that the single prediction of 1939 would be correct for sixteen of seventeen countries is less than one in three thousand.39 Moreover, the ways in which landscape theory's predictions converged on the unique historically correct outcome seem to mirror the changes that actually took place in the late 1930s in Europe as the nations mobilized for war.
It is remarkable that such a simple theory and such a parsimonious operationalization of its concepts can come up with a prediction that is very close to what actually happened. Almost as striking is that departures from what actually happened reflect tenable alternatives to the way history played out.
We are aware of only one other theoretical prediction of the alignments in the Second World War. This is the rational-choice theory of Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita which predicts how nations will choose sides once a war is under way.40 Unlike landscape theory, which uses alliance behaviour only to identify active states, the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita model uses alliances to identify the utilities of the states and bases its predictions about alignments in war on these alliances patterns. The data used by landscape theory (such as religious and ideological differences) are much further back in the causal chain of predicting wartime alignment than are alliance data. Moreover, the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita model predicts events only after the outbreak of the war (for example, avoiding having to predict that Germany and Poland are on opposite sides), whereas landscape theory uses data only from before the outbreak of war, even years before. Yet another difference is that the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita model assesses its predictions only for countries that entered the war within two months of the outbreak, whereas the landscape theory makes predictions for all diplomatically active countries. A major limitation of the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita model is that it requires information about the actual wartime alignments to make any predictions since it needs this information to estimate the relative impact of the components of the expected utility equations. On the other hand, the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita model is superior in allowing for neutrality and in being applicable with only small modifications to wars over a long time period ( In economics, the main approach to alliance formation is to calculate and compare 'coalition structure values' for each possible configuration44 and then use a standard game theoretic analysis to determine both the alliance configuration that is likely to emerge and the stability of each configuration. Unfortunately, the coalition structure value framework is difficult to apply to empirical data since it requires identifying and quantifying payoffs for each actor in every conceivable configuration. Unlike the reliance of landscape theory on pairwise propensities, payoffs for each firm depend in complex ways on choices made by all the other firms. For example, in the standards setting case, the size of the market will vary with the number of standards, and a given firm's market share will vary with (among other factors) how quickly the firm can bring a product to market relative to the other firms. Not surprisingly, there has not been a single empirical test of the coalition structure values approach for the problem of standards setting. There is, however, a rich descriptive and theoretical literature on the subject. 45 The specific case of standards setting chosen for a test of landscape theory is the struggle by technical workstation manufacturers to create a Unix operating system standard. Before collecting the sample of firms for this study, two competitive attributes were identified that were expected to influence the propensities to collaborate in the Unix standards setting case. First, some computer manufacturers have a significant design capability, while others are primarily assemblers of other firms' designs. Secondly, some computer companies specialize in the workstation market, while others are generalists with many lines of computer-related products. In each category, firms with similar capabilities were expected to have difficulty working together because of the head-to-head competition in the markets they address. Firms with different capabilities were expected to complement each other. Of the nine firms in this study, five were workstation specialists and all nine possessed design capability. To determine the propensity of a pair of firms, a value of 1 was assigned when two firms had complementary attributes (specialist-generalist), and -1 when attributes conflicted (two specialists, two generalists or two designers). These values were then summed to measure the propensity for each pair of firms. Since every firm is a designer, this results in total propensity of 0 for distant rivals (generalist-specialist pairs) and -1 for close rivals (generalist-generalist pairs or specialist-specialist pairs).46
The predictions generated by landscape analysis of the Unix case are shown in Table 1 , along with the attributes and the size of each firm. With nine firms, there are 29/2 = 256 unique alliance configurations.47 The resulting landscape has two configurations of locally minimal energy, and these are the predictions of the theory. They have equal energy and equal basin sizes. These are shown in Table 2 as Configuration 1 and Configuration 2.
Historically, the first move in the alliance process was AT&T joining with Sun. Knowing this allows unique prediction, namely Configuration 1. In Configuration 1, six of the seven commitments made after the initial AT&T-Sun link-up are predicted correctly. The probability of a result this good happening by chance is one chance in sixteen.48 Even more importantly, this configuration correctly accounted for the alignments of all the major firms in the workstation market and most of the smaller ones as well. In all, it correctly accounted for 97 per cent of the total size of the firms in the sample. 46 Here is another derivation of the same propensity values. Firms prefer to be aligned with each other to increase the size of their alliance, but they prefer not to align with rivals. For distant rivals, these two considerations counterbalance, making pj = 0. For close rivals, the rivalry consideration dominates, making pi = -1. 47 As in the international cases, it was assumed that there would be at most two groupings. 48 There are 27= 128 ways of assigning the remaining seven firms to two alliances. Of these, one is completely correct and seven are off by one firm. Therefore, the probability of getting six or more of seven right by chance is (7 + 1)/128 = 1/16.
TABLE 2
The 
Social Cleavages in Democracies
Social cleavages based upon ethnicity, race, religion, class and so forth exist in every society, although which cleavages are most important differs from one society to another. In a democracy, political parties typically try to build electoral coalitions in part by paying close attention to the issues that appeal to those on one side or the other of these cleavages. Consequently, the structure of electoral coalitions and the stability of a political system depend in part on whether the major cleavages in a society are mutually reinforcing or are cross-cutting.54 Cleavage theory has a wide application, from debates over redistricting in the United States to the prospects for survival of a multinational state such as the Soviet Union.
Landscape theory offers a way of formalizing cleavage theory and relating it to other coalition theories. To apply landscape theory to social cleavages, the propensities of groups to ally could be based on their pairwise conflict of interest. For example, from the 1930s to at least the 1960s, blacks and Catholics in the United States shared many political interests and therefore a political party could efficiently appeal to both. To account for an alignment such as the New Deal Coalition, landscape theory would need to be extended to allow each group to belong to a coalition to some degree rather than completely or not at all. With this extension, landscape theory could predict how changes in pairwise propensities among the groups would affect the resulting electoral coalitions. For example, it could address the question of whether in a given two-party system there is a single 'natural' electoral coalition configuration at each point in time. It could also characterize conditions under which electoral coalitions would change rapidly from one local minimum to another resulting in so-called 'critical elections'. 55 Landscape theory could also compare the cleavage structures of different societies to analyse the degree to which each country's cleavage pattern results in a 'frustrated system'.56 An interesting feature of cleavage theory is that it proposes that democratic systems are actually more stable if their cleavages result in a frustrated system. The reason is that when cleavages are cross-cutting, few people will be completely dissatisfied.
Organizational Structures
An important principle in organization theory is that an efficient organization is structured so that jobs that require frequent interaction are placed near each other in the organizational structure.57 In landscape theory, the propensity of two jobs to be near each other can be measured by their natural rate of interaction. The distance between two jobs in a given organizational structure can be regarded as the number of layers of the organization that have to be ascended to reach a common boss. Landscape theory might help account for how organizations can have two completely different stable configurations, as when the State Department can be set up along functional lines or along geographic lines.
CONCLUSION
Landscape theory is able to predict international alignments and business alliances. It also offers promise in applications to parliamentary coalitions, friendship networks, social cleavages and organizational structures.
To improve the foundations of landscape theory, two activities would be helpful. First, the particular functional form that the theory takes should be justified in rigorous terms. One way to do this would be to develop a formal set of axioms about the way actors of bounded rationality behave in settings that allow aggregation. The axioms could specify how information about size and propensity are used by the actors in making their myopic choices and how the choices are made incrementally. Additional axioms would specify the allowable forms of aggregation and the symmetry of propensities. With these axioms it should be possible to demonstrate that the formula for energy of a configuration is the appropriate one, that the dynamics of the system must correspond to decreases in energy and that the only stable points of the system are the configurations that have locally minimum energy. Moreover, such a set of axioms would be useful in showing how landscape theory relates to other theories of choice and how variations in landscape theory could lead to other dynamics.
The other way in which the foundations of landscape theory could be improved is by providing guidance on how the concepts of the theory should be operationalized in a particular application. Having a well-developed set of ideas about how propensity should be measured would be particularly helpful. Obviously, the details of measurement of propensity will vary from one application to another. Nevertheless, the use of a limited number of factors to determine all the pairwise propensities is likely to be widely applicable. So it would be helpful to develop some guidance on how these factors should be chosen, and how they should be coded and combined. An example of such guidance is the following: if there are complementary characteristics of actors that allow positive externalities from joint action, then such complementary characteristics should be included as one of the factors, and that factor should be coded so that actors who are dissimilar in this way have a positive propensity to work together. To appreciate the overall orientation of landscape theory, an analogy to research on the Prisoner's Dilemma will help. The value of the Prisoner's Dilemma is not only that it gives accurate predictions, but also that it leads to a deeper understanding of political processes such as the way in which the shadow of the future is essential for co-operation among egoists. Likewise, the intended value of landscape theory is not only in providing accurate predictions, but also in leading to a deeper understanding of aggregation processes such as the way in which an energy landscape can determine which configurations are stable. Just as the Prisoner's Dilemma helps us to see important similarities across a wide range of applications, landscape theory helps us see how the aggregation processes in many different areas do indeed have a surprising similarity when viewed with the aid of a common theoretical framework.
